We investigate the impacts of electricity market restructuring on fuel efficiency, cost of coal purchases, and utilization among coal-fired power plants using a panel data set from 1991 to 2005. Our study contributes to the literature in two aspects: (1) the use of more data from recent years allows us to examine longer term impacts of restructuring;
Introduction
Introducing competitive markets has been perceived, and found empirically in many cases, as a way to increase efficiency and productivity across a wide spectrum of industries. 1 As such, during the 1990s all U.S. states and D.C. had hearings considering the move from regulated electricity generation and transmission, under which so-called cost-of-service pricing existed, to competitive wholesale electricity markets. Here independent generators would sell their electricity to buyers (local distribution companies and large industrial consumers) through competitive spot markets or via long-term contracts that presumably represent perceived spot prices. The potential benefits and pitfalls of such restructuring have been well studied (e.g., Laffont and Tirole, 1993) , but the basic argument in favor of restructuring is quite simple cost-of-service pricing (a form of cost-plus contracting) provides little incentive for integrated electricity companies to become more efficient, while competitive electricity markets should incentivize firms to find lower costs means of generating electricity. 2 Though the argument for restructuring appears quite straightforward, relatively few states passed deregulation and enacted these competitive markets. This is likely, at least in part, to the restructuring-induced difficulties experienced in the California electricity market in 2001 (Fowlie, n.d.) . However, this heterogeneity in wholesale electricity market regulations across states, combined with the availability of now several years of post-restructuring implementation data on generating facilities, presents a suitable setting to empirically analyze the effects of competitive wholesale electricity markets on generators. To that end, we analyze the effect of restructuring on coal-fired generating plants' fuel efficiencies, input fuel purchasing behavior, and capacity utilization based on a panel data set from 1991 to 2005. 3 This study is of course not the first effort to empirically estimate the effects of restructuring on generating firms' behavior. For instance, a number of studies have looked at 1 For example, see competition impacts on efficiency and productivity in telecommunications from Olley and Pakes (1996) , in the concrete industry from Syverson (2004) , in natural gas from Davis and Kilian (2011) , airlines, railroads.
2 Many local distribution companies, the entities that buy power from generators in restructured regions and deliver it to end users, still face some form of downstream pricing regulation so restructuring may not have an impact on power transmission efficiency in the same way it would for power generation. the impacts of restructuring on the market power possibilities that these new markets may present (e.g., Wolfram (1999) ; Hortaçsu and Puller (2008) ; Mansur (2008) ). More related to this study, several recent papers have also looked at the effect of restructuring on plant level efficiency and capacity utilization (e.g., Bushnell and Wolfram (2005) ; Fabrizio et al. (2007) ; Zhang (2007) ; Davis and Wolfram (2012) ). However, our study differs from these in several key ways.
First, our study considers only coal-fired generation plants. Similar to those studies mentioned above that only consider nuclear facilities Zhang (2007) ; Davis and Wolfram (2012) , we believe restricting our sample to coal-fired plants limits confounding factors that could arise from the differences across power generation technologies. Second, as mentioned above, the time span of our data allows us to examine the longer-term impacts of restructuring on coal plants due to the inclusion of several years of post-restructuring observations. This provides a distinct difference from the data used in Fabrizio, Rose and Wolfram (2007) , which ended near, or even before, the time when many proposed competitive markets were implemented. Additionally, the longer time span of our data allows us to differentiate between states that proposed restructuring legislation, but did not actually implement these markets, and those states that actually implemented some form of restructuring. 4
Finally, beyond considering efficiency and capacity utilization aspects of restructuring, we also look at how restructuring affects fuel (i.e., coal) purchasing costs. Considering the restructuring impacts on fuel costs is particularly relevant for coal-fired plants because coal prices have considerable heterogeneity in any given period. Some of this heterogeneity can be explained by observable attributes of the coal such as ash and sulfur content or by the observable coal purchasing arrangements in terms of contract duration. Some of the heterogeneity in coal purchasing prices may also be due to restructuring. For example, plants in restructured regions may have additional incentives to negotiate lower-price contracts or search for lower priced coal.
We find a two to three percent improvement in the fuel efficiency, measured by heat rate (Btu of fuel used divided by electricity output), after restructuring among investor-owned utilities (IOUs) in states that carried out restructuring relative to plants in states without restructuring. This improved efficiency result is in line with the existing literature Bushnell and Wolfram (2005) . When looking at publicly (municipal, state or federal) or cooperatively owned utilities (POUs), which often still fall under cost-of-service pricing regardless of the state laws on restructuring, we find no significant difference in heat rates of POUs in states with restructuring compared to plants in states without competitive electricity markets.
This suggests that there are no measurable efficiency spillovers from IOUs to POUs within restructured states.
When looking at the restructuring effects on the cost of coal purchases per-unit of heat input, we find initially that IOUs in states with restructured markets had a five to six percent lower per-unit cost of coal purchases than plants purchasing coal with similar attributes in cost-of-service states. However, on average, over the range of our data IOUs in regulated regions still have lower per-unit costs of coal than those in restructured regions. This is due to the different attributes of coal predominantly purchased in the different regions, as well as different shipping costs to the regions.
Finally, we looked at how capacity factors (annual output divided by potential output) were altered by restructuring. We find statistically significant lower capacity factors for IOUs in restructured states compared to plants in regulated areas. For IOUs that participate in the created wholesale power markets, base-generation coal plants may have an incentive to withhold production in order to increase the price by forcing a higher-cost producer to the margin or may be forced to reduce overall production if occasionally prices are below their marginal cost. However, at the same time we find capacity factors increase as fuel costs per megawatt hour (MWh) decreases. Given that our heat rate and cost of per-unit coal purchases imply dropping fuel costs per MWh for IOUs in restructured regions, our results find restructuring has two, opposing effects on capacity factors. With our estimated parameters, it appears that the combined effect leads to a lowering of capacity factors for IOUs in restructured regions relative to similar plants in regulated regions. Additionally, this reduced capacity factor result is in contrast to the strong evidence of increased capacity factor for nuclear plants in restructured states found in other studies (Zhang, 2007) . We might expect this given that coal plants have considerably more cycling flexibility than nuclear plants. Thus, nuclear plants are unable to strategically withhold production and with low marginal costs of nuclear generation these plants will not be priced out of competitive markets.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a brief introduction to the electricity sector and restructuring as well as a literature review. Section 3 presents our empirical models and identification strategy. Data are presented in Section 4 and empirical results are in Section 5. Section 6 concludes.
Background and Literature
Traditionally, the U.S. states economically regulated all stages of the electricity industry.
The rationale for this arrangement was that the electricity industry was a natural monopoly.
Public or private firms controlled the generation, transmission, distribution, and retail sectors of the industry. Individual states set the parameters of the regulation but most had a costof-service regulation. Here firms were compensated for operating expenses and a rate of return was allowed for capital costs as long as the state regulators approved any of the firms transactions. As part of the regulation, plants were required to meet the state's electricity demand and thus had less choice over when to produce than in a restructured electricity market. This requirement to produce implied that plants were very concerned with assuring a supply of fuel. This concern was heightened for coal-fired power plants as they are often baseload plants in an electricity system. Baseload plants are utilized at all hours of the day because they are relatively low cost to operate and/or are difficult to stop and start.
The concern over fuel supply meant that a large majority of coal transactions occurred under long-term forward contracts between plants and coal mines. The contracts were quite complex with many provisions to protect against the "hold-up" problem. Joskow (1985, 1990 ) have shown that these contracts are largely adhered to even in the face of changes in the spot market coal price and regulation.
While cost-of-service regulation altered how plants procured their fuel, the incentives to bargain for the best price in the contract negotiations were also altered by this type of regulation. Plants were assured that they would be compensated for the cost of coal if the state regulator had approved the contract. Since the plant is not the residual claimant in the bargaining process, it may have reduced the intensity with which a plant would bargain with a coal mine.
Given that plants operating costs were fully compensated with cost-of-service regulation, there was little incentive to improve the efficiency of generation. Should a plant improve their fuel efficiency, the regulator would reduce the price of electricity that plant would receive at the next rate hearing. This is one of the main arguments given for the switch to a restructured market; to provide incentives to generate electricity more efficiently. Joskow (1997) argues that the scope for medium-run increases in efficiency at generation plants is significant.
Before large scale wholesale market restructuring, a number of states had introduced a variety of alternative measures within the rate-of-return regulation framework in an attempt to improve the performance of generators. Some states conditioned the prices a plant would receive to achieving a given heat rate or capacity factor (Joskow and Schmalensee, 1986) .
Similarly, some states allowed plants to be the residual claimant for a fraction of the difference between actual and forecasted fuel cost (Knittel, 2002) . Knittel (2002) uses the variation of these alternative measures to test whether they lead to technical improvements in plants performance with data from 1981 to 1996. He finds that measures to improve fuel efficiency and to incentivize cost savings have a statistically significant impact.
The Energy Policy Act of 1992 opened the door for electricity wholesale market deregulation by putting a framework in place to allow operators of the transmission grid to alter the manner in which they organized generation. Shortly there after every state and D.C. held hearings on the regulation of their electricity market. Despite the widespread interest in deregulation only 24 states and D.C. enacted legislation concerning restructuring and only 18 followed through.
The initial wave of articles testing whether plants have improved their performance after restructuring generally do not include, or had very little, data after restructuring was in effect. For example, Zhang (2007) used data on nuclear plants from 1992 -1998 , Douglas (2006 use data on coal-fired plants from 1981 -2000 and Fabrizio, Rose and Wolfram (2007 used data on fossil-fueled plants from 1981 -1999 . Fabrizio, Rose and Wolfram (2007 find that IOUs in restructured states reduced their labor and non-fuel operating expenses by 3% compared to IOUs in states that did not restructure. However, they do not find any change in the fuel efficiency from restructuring. Zhang (2007) finds an 11% reduction in operating costs and 7% increase in utilization at nuclear plants when states adopt electricity market restructuring. Both Zhang (2007) and Fabrizio, Rose and Wolfram (2007) argue that anticipation of increase competition led to the resulting changes in firm performance. Douglas (2006) tests whether more efficient plants were dispatched more often when system operators undertook market-oriented reforms. In the mid-1990s north-and central-eastern U.S. system operators altered the dispatch method while the southeast U.S system operators did not. Douglas (2006) uses this natural experiment to show that high efficiency plants were dispatched more often after market-oriented reforms were put into place.
More recently, authors have utilized data available after the restructuring of the electricity market to test whether plants have improved their performance. Bushnell and Wolfram (2005) analyze the fuel efficiency and utilization of natural gas and coal plants that were subject to restructuring, with a focus on those plants which were divested. Using data from 1997 through 2003, they find that divested plants improved their fuel efficiency by 2%.
Plants that were subject to restructuring but not divested improved their fuel efficiency by a statistically equivalent amount, implying that the change in incentives under restructuring is the main driver of the fuel efficiency improvement. Further, they find that divested Many countries other than the U.S. have restructured their electricity market. Using data from India, Cropper et al. (2011) find that plant availability increased by a statistically significant level for plants in restructured states, with the largest gain for states that were the first to restructure. They also test for improvements in fuel efficiency but do not find any statistical evidence to support this hypothesis. Looking at England and Wales, which privatized and restructured their joint public utility in 1990, Newbery and Pollitt (1997) find that restructuring is associated with a 5% reduction in the costs of generation. However, they find that most of these benefits from cost reduction flowed to electricity producers at the expense of consumers and the government.
Several papers have also examined market power possibilities associated with the creation of wholesale electricity markets. Unlike under cost of service regulation, restructuring generally let plants decide at which price they would be willing to generate and, if a plant had market power, allow them to restrict output. Mansur (2007 Mansur ( , 2008 finds that restructuring in the Pennsylvania, New Jersey, and Maryland market allowed plants to take advantage of their market power. For the UK, Wolfram (1999) compares actual price-cost markups in electricity spot transactions with the markups predicted by oligopoly theory. They find substantial markups, indicating market power, however the markups are much smaller than theory predicts.
Empirical Model
The first goal of the paper is to identify the impacts of electricity market restructuring on the behavior of coal-fired power plants in three dimensions: fuel efficiency, coal purchasing practice, and capacity utilization. For fuel efficiency, we focus on fuel efficiency: efficiency measured by the heat rate (in Btus per MWh). Fuel input generally accounts for two thirds of the variable cost in coal-fired power plants (Bushnell and Wolfram, 2005) . Therefore, the overall efficiency of the plant is largely dictated by the heat rate. In examining coal purchasing practice, we focus on the unit cost of coal procurement(real dollars per million Btus). As we discussed above, restructuring changes how power plants earn their revenue and could give firms more incentives to minimize fuel costs by exploring different contracting practices (contract versus spot) and different coal types (high sulfur versus low). Finally, we examine how the capacity utilization is impacted by the restructuring and how the impact varies across different plants. This question is important as it determines whether the market can realize the plant-level efficiency gains by scheduling those plants to produce more often.
Dispatch based on competition in a larger market (compared to traditionally regulated market) should lead to increased utilization among more efficient plants, however market power possibilities may give incentives to reduce generation potential.
Model Specification
Our empirical research design is a difference-in-differences (DD) estimation. The impacts of restructuring are identified through: (1) the fact that some states never undertook restructuring (henceforth, non-restructured states); and (2) the fact that restructuring started in different years in states that went through restructuring (henceforth, restructured states).
In our discussion below, we define the control group to include the coal-fired power plants in non-restructured states and the treatment group to include coal-fired power plants in restructured states, bearing in mind that the temporal variation in treatment adds to the geographic variation for identification of the impacts.
Let i index a plant and t index time (year). To examine fuel efficiency, we follow the literature such as Fabrizio, Rose and Wolfram (2007) and specify the following two-way fixed effect linear regression.
HeatRate it is the heat rate at plant i in year t. RST it is a dummy variable equal to one if the state where plant i is located is a restructured states and started the restructuring process during or before year t and zero otherwise. In the baseline model, we consider the restructuring process starts with the formal hearing by state legislators following Fabrizio, Rose and Wolfram (2007) , allowing behavioral changes by power plants in anticipation of restructuring. IOU it is a dummy variable and equal to one if plant i is part of an IOU at year t. POU it is equal to one if plant i at year t is part of a POU and zero otherwise.
We distinguish the restructuring effect between POU's and IOU's because many POU's within regulated states, particularly municipal utilities, do not participate in the established competitive wholesale market and instead operate under some form of a traditional cost of service regulation. 5
The model controls for observed time-varying covariates, X it . It includes a set of timevarying plant characteristics and regulatory environment such as if the plant has scrubber installed, which is known to negatively affect fuel efficiency, if the plant participates in the first phase of the SO 2 permit trading program, generation capacity (in logarithm), and the output level (in logarithm). The inclusion of both capacity and the output level variables allows the heat rate to be affected by the size of the plant as well as the utilization rate. The output variable is likely to be endogenous due to simultaneity and we discuss the identification strategy in the next subsection. The regression also includes a full set of plant fixed effects, δ i , to control for time-invariant factors such as the design of a plant that could affect the heat rate. A full set of year fixed effects for IOUs, η t and a full set of year fixed effects for POUs are included to control for plant-invariant factors that affect the heat rate such as technology change. u it is the idiosyncratic error term. In this setup, the OLS estimateα can be used to estimate the program effect. 6
To examine whether restructuring changes power plants' coal procurementpractice, we estimate the following equation
(2) 5 For example, the Gibbons Creek power plant in Texas, which has a competitive wholesale market, is operated by the Texas Municipal Power Agency (TMPA). TMPA operates as a non-profit municipality and is wholly owned by the cities it serves: Bryan, Denton, Garland and Greenville Texas. 6 As the equation takes the semi-logarithmic functional form and RST it is a dummy variable, a consistent and unbiased estimator for the percentage impact of the dummy regressor on the leveled dependent variable
UnitHeatCost it is the per-unit heat cost of based on all coal purchased (in dollars per MMBtus) by plant i in year t. The restructuring and plant dummy variables in this equation are defined similar to those in (1) while X it in this equation contains different variables than those in (1). In particular, to control for coal types on unit heat cost, we include sulfur content and ash content (per million Btus). X it also includes the logarithm of coal quantity purchased (in million Btus) to control for possible volume discount. In addition, the vector contains the share of coal purchased from the spot market. Most power plants purchase coal from both the spot market and the long-term contract. Since long-term contracts offer better hedge against price volatilities, prices of contract coal are generally higher and with higher sulfur content based on the data. The spot share variable is used to control for the difference in the price risk from these two purchasing channels. Both the quantity purchased and the spot share could be endogenous due to simultaneity and the identification is discussed in the next subsection. The additional variables in X it also appear in the heat rate equation above: a dummy variable for scrubber, a dummy variable for participation in the first phase of the SO 2 permit trading program, and generation capacity.
The third equation is used to investigate the impact of restructuring on capacity utilization:
CapFactor it is the capacity factor of plant i in year t. It is defined by the annual output (MWh) divided by the generation capacity (MW) *365*24. The dependent variable, strictly increasing in capacity factor, is defined to have support on both sides of zero. The signs of the coefficient estimates will provide the direction of the partial effects of the explanatory variables on the capacity factor itself. As we discussed above, restructuring could affect plant utilization through central dispatch where the order is dictated by the marginal cost of production. Before the restructuring was officially under way and the new market emerges, the impact on capacity utilization was likely to be small if it exists at all. Therefore, different from equations (1) and (2), we allow the treatment to start when the restructuring registration was passed. The dummy variable, LawPass it is one if the state where plant i is located is a restructured states and passed the restructuring legislation during or before
year t and zero otherwise. X it includes plant and regulatory variables : if the plant has scrubber installed, if the plant participates in the first phase of SO 2 permit trading program, and generation capacity. In addition, it also includes the cost of heat input (from coal) per KWh. We include this variable because one would expect that plants with higher operating expenses, which fuel costs account for the vast majority of, would have lower capacity factors (Fabrizio et al., 2007) . However, this variable is simultaneously determined with the capacity factor (e.g., plants with low operating costs may have higher capacity factors, but technical features of the plant may be such that altering capacity factor levels affect operating costs) and we discuss our estimation strategy below.
Identification
There are at least three concerns in estimating restructuring impacts based on the empirical models outlined above. The first one has to do with the identification of restructuring effects based on the coefficient estimate α on the restructuring dummy variables while the second one arises from the potential endogeneity of some of the explanatory variables in X it alluded to above. The third one has to do with plant exit in our data. This could lead to a selection bias if less efficient plants are more likely to exit. The second concern turns out to be empirically important and we discuss these three in turn.
Although all three regression equations discussed in the previous section include plant fixed effects and year fixed effects, the consistency ofα as an estimator of restructuring effects still relies on the exogeneity of the treatment That is, the timing of restructuring is uncorrelated with the idiosyncratic error term in the three equations: heat rate, unit heat cost of coal purchased, and capacity factor. This assumption could be violated if states choose to initiate the restructuring process in response to time-varying factors that affect these variables at coal-fired power plants. We believe that this violation is unlikely to happen: the driving force behind the restructuring that started in California and states in the Northeast was high electricity prices, reflecting high historical average costs from uneconomic investments (in nuclear plants) and long-term procurementcontracts by utilities (?). The timing of the legislative process is likely determined by political reasons rather than behavioral changes in coal-fired power plants.
The second empirical challenge arises from the potential endogeneity in some of the explanatory variables in X it in each of the three equations. Equation (1) on the heat rate includes plant output (electricity generation) as one of the explanatory variables. Since the output level and heat rate at a plant are determined at the same time during the course of plant operation, we face an endogeneity issue due to simultaneity. We employ state-level total electricity consumption, gross state product, housing starts and nature gas price to construct instrumental variables for plant output. State-level electricity consumption reflects electricity demand which would in turn affect plant utilization and output. However, the operating conditions in a particular plant that affect plant efficiency (e.g., unscheduled maintenance) is unlikely to affect state-level electricity demand. In the same spirit, we add gross state product and housing starts to capture state-level electricity demand conditions.
We use the price of natural gas as an additional instrument because it affects the marginal cost of natural gas power plants and hence their competitiveness with (and electricity demand from) coal plants. The effect of state-level demand fluctuations on plant output is likely to vary according to plant characteristics, such as if a plant is a baseload plant and its size. To capture this, we interact these four variables with state-level generation profile: the share of coal plant capacity (over total generation capacity in the state). In total, we have eight instruments as the full set of instruments. We experiment with using different subsets of the IVs in the regressions. The results, as shown below, are generally robust to the selection.
However, the issue of weak IV arises when we use electricity consumption alone as was done in Fabrizio, Rose and Wolfram (2007).
A similar simultaneity issue exists in equation (2). The two explanatory variables, total coal purchased and the share of coal purchased from the spot market, are determined at the same time as the dependent variable, the unit price of all coal purchased. For example, unexpected high demand could increase both the total purchase and the purchase from the spot market, as well as increasing per-unit costs of coal. To instrument for them, we use the same set of instrumental variables discussed above.
Equation (3) on, we found that the form-767 data have many missing observations in its net generation as well as the fuel use series. The EIA-906/920 data, which also collects monthly fuel use and net generation data, appeared to be more complete for 2001 -2005. 9 We therefore used the 906/920-form data to collect fuel use and generation data over the 2001 -2005 span. 10 To get data on fuel procurement, we used FERC-423 data. The 423 form collects monthly reports on the fuel purchases, including the heat, ash, and sulfur content of the purchased coal, the origin of the fuel as well as the purchase cost (inclusive of delivery), for each plantlevel transaction made by coal-fired power plants in the United States. Given that our net generation data are annual observations, we develop a yearly average measure of the relevant form 423 covariates. We compute a weighted average of the ash and sulfur content using heat content of each transaction as the weight. Analogously, we compute the total cost of coal purchases by summing across all fuel cost multiplied by the respective heat content.
Annual per-unit heat prices are formed by dividing total annual fuel costs by total annual heat content. The 423 form also records whether these transactions are done in a spot market or they are contract deliveries. 11 We compute the share of the spot coal purchases made by each plant, defined as the ratio of heat content of all spot coal purchases to the total heat content of all coal purchases, since it will certainly affect the total cost of coal due to differences in the pricing for spot and contract coal.
It should be noted that in the data we use, the number of plants reporting coal procurementdata contracts significantly after 1999. 12 The data appears to be dropped for confidentiality reasons -privately-owned plants operating in deregulated regions were not required to report coal procurementcost data and thus the number of responding plants decreased.
This then raises concerns of selection bias for our remaining sample. To check if the dropped plants are significantly different than the plants that remain in the sample after 1999, we compare the 1999 mean and variance of heat rate, per-unit cost of heat, and capacity factor between the group of IOU plants that remain in the data after 1999 and those that are not available after 1999. We find no significant difference between those plants that remain in the sample post-1999 and those that are not based on heat rate and per-unit cost of heat.
For capacity factors, we find the means of those that remain is statistically different from the plants that exit. Despite the difference in terms of their capacity factors (the group with cost data have significantly larger capacity factors of a magnitude of 7%), their trends, allaying concerns over the threat to our identification.
Finally, to construct the restructuring dummy variables RST it we follow the definition used in Fabrizio, Rose and Wolfram (2007) , where the restructuring dummy becomes one when hearings on restructuring begin. 13 However, unlike Fabrizio, Rose and Wolfram (2007), we only turn on the restructuring dummy (set the dummy equal to one) for plants that are in states where restructuring actually took place. That is, we acknowledge that there may have been some early action taken by plants who expected deregulation, but we account for the possibility that firms may have known the likelihood of actually deregulating and responded accordingly. For the dummy variable LawP ass it , we use the date at which the law passed based on the state-level information provided on the EIA website 11 EIA defines a spot purchase as "a single shipment of fuel or volumes of fuel purchased for delivery within 1 year."
12 The FERC-423 data that we use was downloaded in 2006. The data available online has since been altered and now reports coal procurementdata for an even more restricted set of plants. 13 We use the same timing when the restructuring dummy becomes one as used in Fabrizio, Rose and (www.eia.gov/cneaf/electricity/page/restructuring/restructure elec.html).
In addition to the difference in the definition of the restructuring dummy, our data also affords several other key differences relative to Fabrizio, Rose and Wolfram (2007) .
First, given the more recent data that we use, we are looking at some long-run effects of the restructuring, since altering fuel contracts and efficiency improving investments involve time and adjustment costs. Second, our treatment group is comprised of a more complete set of restructured states, as some states (like Maryland and New Jersey) restructured the market in 1999 and Michigan restructured in 2000. We separated the treatment groups into private firms (IOUs) and municipal firms (POUs) which are still being regulated, allowing the effects to be different across the two groups. Following Fabrizio, Rose and Wolfram (2007), we only allow plants that have at least three years of observations. Unlike Fabrizio, Rose and Wolfram (2007), we did not assign a different plant code for plants with a significant change in capacity, defined as either 15% or a 40 MW change to allow a different plant fixed effects for the plant before and after the capacity change. We postulate that the efficiency gain (as measured in heat rate) due to restructuring can possibly come from the generator installations and retirements -by treating these plants using the same plant dummy, we are attributing the efficiency gain (by comparing the deregulated IOUs to the control) to the restructuring. coincide from what we have seen in the last two panels in Table 1 . From Figure 1 , heat rate increases(relative to the control group) after the year 2001 for IOUs in both regulated and deregulated states. These results seem to suggest that there is a decrease in fuel efficiency for these restructured plants. However, as briefly mentioned above and as we will see from the next section, when we start controlling for other factors including plant fixed effects, there is actually evidence that the fuel efficiency increases for the restructured plants. Figure 2 provides an apparent evidence that shows that the unit cost of heat input decreases over time for restructured IOUs, implying that there is a cost efficiency achievement by these plants (despite a spike for restructured POUs after 2003), while in Table 1 when we are just comparing the differences, it suggests that unit cost of heat input purchased by restructured firms is higher than regulated ones, even after controlling time trend. Figure 3 shows capacity factor over time. The IOUs in both deregulated and regulated states show an increase in capacity factor over time, while post 2000 the increase for restructured IOUs slows down. It seems to suggest that they were operating more intensively before restructuring, than moved to profit maximizing output levels under the introduction of markets. In the next section, regression results on these three outcome variables will be presented, which we will be able to tell a better story by conditioning these changes on the observables like output, age of the plant and generation capacity. Table 2 provides estimation results for equation (1) that explores the relationship between restructuring and plant thermal efficiency, as measured inversely by derived annual heat rate values. We report results from nine regressions. All standard errors are clustered at the plant level to allow for serial correlation in the error term.
Estimation Results

Plant fuel efficiency
The first two columns are from OLS with the first one not including plant fixed effects.
The results from the first column suggests that restructuring is associated with 2.7 percent reduction in heat rate (i.e., an improvement in efficiency) for IOUs and 5.5 percent increase in heat rate for POUs. By including plant fixed effects, both effects are close to and not statistically different from zero. The third column is from GMM with the Log(output) variable instrumented using the full set of instruments, which pass both underidentification and overidentification tests. The results suggest that restructuring leads to 2.1 percent reduction in heat rate for IOUs and no change for POUs in states that underwent restructuring. 14 The coefficient estimate on Log(output) implies that a one percent increase in electricity generation in the plant (holding capacity and other variables fixed) would leads to 0.172 percent reduction in heat rate. This is much larger than the result (0.056) from OLS, suggesting a positive correlation between the output variable and the error term. Such a correlation may be explained in part through engineering aspects of plant operations. For instance, increasing ambient air temperatures increase electricity demand and thus output, but may also adversely affect plant efficiency (International Energy Agency , IEA).
Columns 4 to 6 employ different sets of instruments. Column 4 uses only state electricity consumption as the IV. We fail to reject the null of underidentification, suggesting a weak IV. The coefficient estimate on the restructuring, although close to that in column 3, is not statistically significant. Column 5 adds the interaction between state electricity consumption and the share of coal generation capacity. We obtain very similar estimates to those in column 3. Column 6 uses the six other instruments and reports similar coefficient estimates.
In column 7, we focus on the set of plants that stay in the sample throughout the data period (i.e., a balanced panel) and obtain very similar results to those from the full data set in column 3. Columns 8 and 9 are from regressions excluding POUs to alleviate potential confounding factors. The control group in these regressions includes only IOUs in the nonrestructured states. The results from these two regressions are very similar to those in columns 2 and 3, their full sample counterparts.
Across GMM specifications, we consistently find that restructuring improves fuel efficiency of IOUs from 2 to 3 percent. In all regression but the first one, there is no statistically significant and economically meaningful effect for POUs. Results in all regressions suggest that a higher output (hence plant utilization) comes with an improved efficiency. The other explanatory variables used in the heat rate regressions have mixed levels of significance. The regressions do not find a statistically significant effect from the first phase of the CAA's Acid Rain Program. The coefficient estimates on scrubber installation is negative in all GMM regressions but is not significant except in column (9). All regressions also include Log(capacity) and its quadratic terms, but the coefficients are never found to be statistically significant except in column 1. We also tried other regressions with various permutations of these variables, as well as specifications with additional and fewer explanatory variables.
The results from these specifications are not materially different from those presented here.
As discussed above in the literature review, the effect of restructuring on fuel efficiency of power plants, including coal-fired plants, has been examined in Fabrizio, Rose and Wolfram (2007) and Bushnell and Wolfram (2005) . While the former did not find an effect using data of all power plants from 1981 to 1999, the latter find that divested plants improved their fuel efficiency by 2% based on data of coal and natural gas plants from 1997 to 2003. Our estimates based on coal-fired plants suggest an efficiency gain from 2 to 3 percent. Since our empirical setup on this equation follows closely with Fabrizio, Rose and Wolfram (2007), a discussion is warranted as to why we obtain different results.
First, to check the effect of sample period on the estimation, we restrict our analysis to data from 1991 to 1999. The specification based on column 3 provides a coefficient estimate of -0.018 (0.006) on the restructuring dummy, compared with -0.021 based on the full sample. This suggests that within a few years of state hearings on restructuring, some efficiency gain has been achieved. Second, to make our specification even closer to Fabrizio, Rose and Wolfram (2007), we perform the analysis using the restricted sample and the same instrument, state-level electricity consumption. We fail to find any effect: the coefficient estimate on the restructuring dummy is 0.008 with a standard error of 0.016. This finding is consistent with results in column 4 which uses the full sample but the single instrument.
However, when using the single instrument we fail to reject the null of underidentification with a P-value of 0.40. Additionally, the first-stage t-statistic on the instrument is only -0.86.
These comparisons suggest that the selection of the instrument might be a cause behind the discrepancy in the finding. We should note though that the issue of weak instrument may not exist in Fabrizio, Rose and Wolfram (2007) given that they examine all power plants while our analysis is based solely on coal-fired power plants.
The comparison using the full sample and the subsample from 1991 to 1999 suggests that the efficiency gain may have been realized relatively quickly. To further examine this, we modify equation (1) to examine the time trend of the treatment plants (relative to the control plants) by replacing the restructuring dummy with an interaction term between year dummies and a dummy variable for the treatment plants (e.g., in states that eventually underwent restructuring). Figure 4 plots the regression coefficients on the these interactions and the 95 percent confidence interval where we use IOUs only to ease exposition (similar pattern holds from the regression with all plants). The coefficient for year 1991 is normalized to be zero. The trend plot suggests that the heat rate among the treatment plants was decreasing over time from -0.02 in 1992 to -0.07 in 1999, which is consistent with the fact that more plants in the group actually started the restructuring process. The majority of the restructured states initiated the hearing process in 1994 and 1995 and all started the process by 1998. A puzzling observation from the plot is that the downward trend ended in 1999 and somewhat reversed it after that, especially in year 2001. In 2001, there was also a significant spike in natural gas prices. This may have affected average efficiency levels in deregulated regions by forcing greater production from lower efficiency coal plants.
Coal Purchases
Coal is not a heterogeneous product, but rather has several key product attributes that affect price. In addition, coal can also be purchased via short-term contracts (spot purchases) or longer term contracts (contract purchase) that define the purchasing agreement over several years.These different types of purchasing agreements can also affect pricing. Because data on the attributes of coal purchased and the manner in which it was purchased (under contract or via a spot purchase) is available, we can determine whether being in a restructured state has any impact on coal purchase costs. To do this we estimate equation (2). implies a more negative relationship between unit cost and quantity purchased: one percent increases in total quantity purchased leads to a 0.2 percent drop in unit price. The coefficient estimate on the spot share is positive but not significant. This underscores the endogeneity in the spot share variable and the reverse causality is picked up in the OLS regression: when the spot market offers a lower price (e.g., due to random shocks), a larger percentage would be purchased from the spot market.
The key variable of interest, restructuring dummy (RST) interacting with the IOU dummy, has positive and statistically significant coefficient estimate in column 1. The effect becomes zero in column 2. In column 3 with GMM, the coefficient estimate suggests that restructuring reduces the unit cost by 6.3 percent. This result is consistent with the notion that IOU power plants in states that have undergone wholesale market deregulation may become more cost-conscious and seek ways to reduce the fuel cost. Column 4 uses only two instruments: state electricity consumption and its interaction with the share of coal capacity in the state. The two instruments are weak for the two endogenous variables and the coefficient estimates have large standard errors to prevent interpretation. Column 5 employs the other six instruments and the results suggest a 5.3 percent reduction in unit cost as a result of restructuring. Column 6 focuses on the plants that stay in the data throughout the sample period and suggests a reduction in unit cost of 5.7 percent. Columns 7 and 8 are based on IOUs only. The results from GMM in column 8 are very similar to the full sample counterpart in column 3.
In terms of other explanatory variables, we again find mixed levels of statistical significance. We do not find a statistically significant effect from the first phase of the SO 2 allowance trading program and scrubber installation. Across GMM estimations, we consistently find that plants with large capacity pay lower per-unit coal prices (estimates not reported in the table). One would expect this result if larger plants are able to get volume discounts or are more generally in better bargaining positions. The coefficient estimates on sulfur content (not reported in the table) are neither statistically nor economically significant across GMM estimations. The coefficient estimates on ash content ranges from 0.005 to 0.008 in GMM estimations and are statistically significant in columns 3 and 6.
The coefficient estimates on sulfur and ash content may seem counterintuitive as sulfur and ash are often thought to be undesirable characteristics of coal. In addition, the emissions of SO 2 from coal plants was regulated in one form or another for many of the plants during the sample period. In particular, the implementation of the SO 2 allowance trading program gives a clear cost signal for the emissions of sulfur among participating plants. This would suggest a negative relationship between sulfur content and unit cost. However, the sulfur and ash content are correlated with other characteristics of the coal which we do not control. In particular, they are negatively related to the maturity of the coal and as a result, high sulfur and ash content often means less of other undesired features of coal such volatile matter and moisture that decreases the value of coal (Bellas and Lange (2007) ).
To check how the the SO 2 allowance trading program affect the relationship between sulfur content and coal price, we add an interaction between sulfur content with a dummy variable being one since 1995 when the allowance trading program started. Based on the specification in column 3, we obtain a coefficient estimate of -0.028 with a standard error of 0.017 for the interaction. The coefficient estimate on the sulfur content variable itself is 0.027 with a standard error of 0.018. These two coefficients suggests that the premium associated with high sulfur content (a reflection of better maturity) is negated by the SO 2 regulation. Nevertheless, the ash content is still positive (0.006) and statistically significant at the 10 percent level.
Across our specifications presented, the estimated parameters consistently imply that restructuring leads to a 5 to 6 percent reduction in unit cost of heat input. This could happen if restructuring induces better purchasing practice (e.g., through better bargaining or a better mix of spot and contract purchases). However, as we mentioned above, significant amounts of coal purchased by plants has historically come in the form of long-term contracts. If such contracts were agreed upon prior to the implementation of electricity market restructuring, plants in restructured regions might not have been immediately able to respond to the incentives of being the residual claimant induced by competitive wholesale markets. Only when coal contracts are renegotiated could a firm's improved bargaining-power be exercised.
In addition, it may take time for firms to learn how to optimize plant operations under restructuring and implement this in their coal procurement negotiations. If such conditions exist, cost-savings in coal purchase price may take time to materialize. To examine the trend in the reduction in unit cost, we modify equation (2) by replacing the restructuring dummy with the interactions between year dummies and the treatment group dummy. Figure 5 shows the coefficient estimates on these interactions (1992 to 2005) . The trend is relative to that for the plants in the control group. There is a clear downward trend from 1997 and the trend continues through 2005 with the exception of 2001 and 2002. In contrast with the plot for heat rate, this plot suggests that changes in coal procurement practice take a longer time to materialize possibly due to existing long-term contracts.
To our knowledge, this results showing that restructuring leads to lower per-unit input prices has not been shown before in the literature and has not been discussed as a possible mechanism by which competitive electricity markets can lower costs. To further analyze whether restructuring altered plants procurement of fuel, a hedonic price analysis of coal contract data was undertaken. The EIAs Coal Transportation Rate Database was used to determine whether the price of heat differed for contracts whose vintage is after restructuring legislation was implemented compared to contacts of vintage before restructuring. Contract vintage is either the year the contract was signed, if there had been no renegotiations or the year of the last renegotiation. A restructured vintage dummy variable is created which takes the value of one for contracts whose vintage is after the implementation of electricity market restructuring and is zero otherwise. This restructured vintage dummy is then interacted with the Btu content of coal in each contract transaction. If plants in a restructured market improved their bargaining position when contracts were being negotiated then the interaction term will be negative and imply a lower cost of heat in those transactions. Results, available from the authors by request, of the hedonic analysis find that the cost of heat in contract whose vintage is after restructuring was statistically smaller than those of a traditional regulation vintage by 4% footnoteResults available from the author by request.
Capacity Factor
Finally, we consider the effect that restructuring has on plant-level capacity factors by estimating equation (3). Different from previous two equations, we specify the treatment to begin when the restructuring laws was passed in the corresponding state because until the various restructuring laws went into effect, plants were still traditionally regulated and thus many of the possible capacity-factor altering incentives would not have taken effect. The restructuring dummy is defined as LawPass it which is equal to one once the restructuring law was passed in the state.
The a priori expected signs of the parameters associated with the restructuring dummies are less apparent. Recent studies such as Zhang (2007) and Davis and Wolfram (2012) have found that restructuring, as well as ownership consolidation, has lead to increased capacity factors among U.S. nuclear facilities. This makes intuitive sense as one might expect that competition would force generators to more fully utilize their existing capital.
However, base load coal-fired generators in wholesale electricity markets may have incentive to reduce production in order to force higher-cost generators on to the margin, thus reaping the benefits of higher market clearing prices. Evidence of such behavior has been found in several studies (e.g. Wolfram, 1999; Hortaçsu and Puller, 2008; Mansur, 2008) . In addition, less efficient plants in wholesale electricity markets may more often get under-bid and thus more frequently forced out of the market.
Results from eight regressions based on equation (3) are given in 4. The first column provides results from an OLS estimation without plant fixed effects while the second column includes planted fixed effects. The coefficient estimate on Log(cost per KWh) is negative and statistically significant in both equations, implying a negative correlation between fuel cost and plant utilization. The coefficient estimate on the restructuring dummy for IOUs is negative and statistically significant in column 2, suggesting that restructuring is associated with a reduction in capacity utilization. Since the dependent variable is Log(capacity factor/(1-capacity factor)), the magnitude of this effect is not immediately apparent. For an average plant with a 60 percent capacity factor, the coefficient estimate of 0.195 implies a 8 percent reduction in capacity factor due to restructuring (approximately 0.195*(1-0.6)).
The third column reports the GMM results where Log(cost per KWh) is instrumented with the full set of instruments. The coefficient estimate on the cost variable becomes -1.434 compared to -0.604 in column 2, implying the elasticity of capacity factor with respect to cost per KWh of -0.57 compared to -0.24 for a plant with a 60 percent capacity factor. The change in coefficient estimate on the cost variable from OLS to GMM suggests a positive correlation between the variable and error term. For example, if a plant experiences a positive demand shock (e.g., due to a shutdown of a competing plant), the plant would need to buy more coal, generally at a higher price than pervious purchases, hence increasing the unit cost of generation.
The coefficient estimate on the restructuring dummy in column 3 implies a 9 percent reduction on capacity factor from restructuring, compared to 8 percent from column 2.
In fact, the effect is estimated very similar across columns 2 to 8. Columns 4 uses two instruments: state electricity consumption and its interaction with the share of coal capacity while column 5 use the other six instruments. In both regressions, the coefficient on the cost variable are not statistically significant, likely a reflection of the strength of instruments.
Column 6 focus on plants who did not exit during the data period. Columns 7 and 8 are based on IOUs only.
Across the speciations, we find a 8 to 9 percent reduction in capacity factor for coal-fired power plants due to restructuring based on the coefficient estimates on the restructuring dummy for IOUs, all else equal. However, this estimate does not represent the complete effect of restructuring on plant utilization. Our results from the heat rate and unit cost equations suggest that restructuring also decreases heat rate (i.e., increases plant efficiency) and reduces unit cost of coal, which in turn implies a lower cost per MWh. Meanwhile, our estimates from the capacity factor equation show that a lower generation cost leads to a higher capacity factor. These results imply a countervailing force on capacity factor through the cost side. The net effect will be analyzed in the next section. With respect to the other explanatory variables, the participation of the first phase SO 2 allowance trading program is associated with a 5 to 6 percent reduction in utilization across GMM results. All the other explanatory variables including Log(capacity) and its quadratic term do not have statistical significant effect.
To investigate how the effect of restructuring on capacity utilization plays out over time,
we run a regression similar to that in column 8 but replacing the restructuring dummy with interaction terms between year dummies and the treatment group dummy. Figure 6 shows the coefficient estimates on these interactions (1992 to 2005) . There is a continuing downward trend over time from -0.1 to -0.55. This trend, however, should not be viewed alone. Figure 5 depicts a continuous reduction in coal input, which would counteract the downward trend in capacity factor.
Cost Savings and Environmental Impacts
Given the parameters derived from the estimated equations above, we can derive back-ofthe-envelope calculations of cost savings and environmental benefits associated with deregulation. We consider these "back-of-the-envelope" calculations because we do not consider greater general equilibrium effects that would also be associated with deregulation. While not accounting for these general equilibrium effects obviously reduces the accuracy of the results presented below, we believe these cruder calculations are still useful in giving ballparkestimates of the cost and environmental effects of deregulation for coal plants. The calculations are summarized in 5. Note that these values were based on average operation numbers from the last year of our data (2005) . We also made these calculations based on plant operation averages over the span 2001-2005 and they were approximately the same as those presented below, so we exclude them for brevity's sake.
We begin with the equations using Log ( 
where X it is a vector of all the remaining right-hand-side terms of equation (3) (including individual and year fixed effects and residuals) and β it is the corresponding parameter vector.
As mentioned above, deregulation effects the dependent variable ln CapF actor it 1−CapF actor it through two channels in (3) will depend on what types of generators make up for this lost production. Given the generation profile of restructured states, it seems likely that the reduced coal-fired generation is substituted by generation from nuclear plants, natural gas plants, or some combination of these two. If we assume that effectively emissions-free nuclear plants supplant all the reduced coal-fired generation and using the same emission rates as given above, then the deregulation-induced change in capacity factors for coal plants reduced annual per-plant emissions by an average of 1300 mt of SO 2 , 600 mt of NO X , and 224,923 mt of CO 2 . Note that these results imply that if reduced coal-fired generation is replaced with the nuclear generation, the emission savings from deregulation-induced reduction in capacity factors are greater than that from the deregulation-induced improved efficiency.
If instead we assume the reduced coal-fired production was replaced with natural gas-fired require a more in-depth market study that is beyond the scope of the current work.
Conclusion
Starting from mid 1990's, about half of the U.S. states passed legislation to restructure their electricity industry in order to improve economic efficiency by increasing competition and eventually to reduce electricity costs to ratepayers. In this paper, we provide a further investigation into the impacts of this restructuring. Our study differs from previous literature in the following three aspects: (1) a longer data period than what has been previously used allows us to examine the effects in both the short and medium run;
(2) focusing on coal-fired power plants avoids confounding factors from different generation technologies; and (3) we examine the impacts on three aspects of plant operation: plant efficiency, utilization, and coal procurementpractice.
Our analysis suggests a two to three percent improvement in the heat rate after restructuring among investor-owned utilities (IOUs) in states that carried out restructuring relative to IOUs in states without restructuring. These figures are consistent with other studies of heat rate such as Bushnell and Wolfram (2005) . To our knowledge, this paper is the first to analyse whether coal purcahse practice changed as a result of restructuring. We find that the cost of coal purchased on per unit heat basis has decreased among IOUs in states with restructured markets by five to six percent relative to coal with similar characteristics purchased by plants in cost of service regions. Finally, our results show that restructuring itself lowers capacity factors, but that lower generation costs, which can occur because of deregulation, are associated with higher capacity factors. Based on our sample averages it appears as though the net marginal effect of restructuring has lead to a reduction of capacity factor for IOUs in deregulated regions relative to their cost of service counterparts.
To put our parameter estimates into context, we also calculated per-plant annual savings and emission reductions associated with restructuring. We found, due to deregulation induced efficiency improvements and reductions in per-unit coal costs, IOU plants in restructured region had an average annual cost savings of $2 million and $5.5 million, respectively. (1) to (4), standard deviations are shown in the parentheses; for panels (5) and (6), clustered (at the plant level) standard errors are shown in the parentheses. For panels (5) and (6), * * * , * * , * indicate 99%, 95% and 90% significance levels respectively. Respective data sources are described in Section 4 in the paper. Note: The dependent variable is Log(heat rate). All regressions include Log(capacity), its quadratic term, and year fixed effects. Columns 1 to 7 also include IOU-specific year fixed effects. Standard errors, in parentheses, are clustered at the plant level. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels. We report P-values for the underidentification test based on Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic and the overidentificiation test based on Hansen J-Statistic. Column 3 uses all 8 IVs while column 4 uses only Log(state electricity sales). Column 5 adds the share of state electricity generation from coal interacting with Log(state electricity sales) and column 6 uses the other 6 IVs. Column 7 focus on plants that stayed in the data throughout. Columns 8 and 9 use only IOUs. 
(3) Note: The dependent variable is Log(Unit Heat Cost). All regressions include sulfur content of coal purchased, ash content, Log(Capacity), its quadratic term, and year fixed effects. Columns 1 to 6 also include IOU-specific year fixed effects. Standard errors, in parentheses, are clustered at the plant level. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels. We report P-values for the underidentification test based on Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic and the overidentificiation test based on Hansen J-Statistic. Column 3 uses all 8 IVs while column 4 uses 2 IVs: Log(state electricity sales) and the interaction between the share of state electricity generation from coal with Log(state electricity sales). Column 5 uses the other 6 IVs and column 6 focus on plants that stayed in the data throughout. Columns 7 and 8 use only IOUs. 
(3) 
